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Claiming Electronic and Software
Technologies: The Effect of the Federal
Circuit Decisions in Alappat, Warnwrdam,
and Lowry on the Claiming of Mathematical
Algorithms and Data Structures
BRIAN RIcHARD YOSHIDAt
INTRODUCTION
The rapid emergence of the computer era has motivated de-
velopers to seek patent protection for their computer program-
related inventions.' Since the 1950s, patents for inventions us-
ing stored program control have existed, though the disclosures
often did not highlight the software aspects of the inventions. 2
Since the late 1960s and early 1970s, the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (hereinafter USPTO) and the courts have
struggled to resolve which computer program-related inventions
represent patentable subject matter and which fall under the
exceptions to patentability relating to laws of nature and ideas.3
t Associate, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, L.L.P., Pittsburgh, PA; B.S.; 1991, Rochester
Institute of Technology (Mechanical Engineering); M.S., 1992, Rochester Institute of
Technology (Mechanical Engineering); JD., 1996, State University of New York at Buf-
falo School of Law.
1. Computer program-related inventions is a phrase used to describe computer im-
plemented processes involving the execution of a computer program and programmed
computers.
2. Melvin C. Garner et al., Electronics and Computer-Related Subject Matter, in AD-
VANCED CLAI DA'rFTNG AND AMENDMENT WrMNG WORKSHOP 1992, at 265 (PLI Pat.,
Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 353, 1992).
3. See generally Application of Prater, 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968), rehg, 415 F.2d
1393 (C.C.PA. 1969) (where the patent application for a method of processing spectro-
graphic data to produce a quantitative spectrographic analysis of qualitatively-known
mixtures by which unknown component concentrations could be determined with mini-
mum error was rejected); Application of Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.PA. 1969) (where
the patent application for a method of and apparatus for automatically making a two-
dimensional portrayal of a three-dimensional object from any desired angle and distance
and on any desired plane of projection was accepted); Application of Mahony, 421 F.2d
742 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (where the patent application for "synchronizing circuit" for automat-
ically synchronizing receiver of digital information was accepted); and Application of
Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.PA 1970) (where the patent application relating to "Cor-
rections for Seismic Data Obtained from Expanding-Spread" was accepted).
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In the last twenty years, greater attention has focused on
the possibility of obtaining patent protection. This is due to the
explosion of microprocessor and computer technology and the ac-
companying increase in the importance of the methodology of
programming such computers. 4 The difficulty in resolving the
debate between the courts and the USPTO stems from inherent
problems conceptualizing the unique nature of computer pro-
gram-related inventions. Computer program-related inventions
are said to "defy the conceptual molds provided by the tradi-
tional patent and copyright systems."5 A computer program-
related invention can be described as a process designed to ac-
complish a certain task, as an apparatus or machine to perform
a certain task, or as something in between. At least one com-
mentator sees this difficulty as a reason to deny patent protec-
tion for all computer program-related inventions.6
However, new and useful computer program-related inven-
tions and algorithms, including mathematical algorithms, should
constitute subject matter eligible for patent protection as
processes or machines.7 Yet, prior to the Federal Circuit deci-
sions in In re Alappat,8 In re Warmerdam,9 and In re Lowry,10
the state of the law had been that mathematical algorithms "as
such" or "in the abstract" do not constitute patentable subject
matter." This was true in theory, but in fact a large number of
4. See, eg., Jeffi-ey S. Goodman, Note, The Policy Implications of Granting Patent
Protection To Computer Software: An Economic Analysis, 37 VAND.L.Rv. 147, 148 n.1 &
2 (1984).
5. Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection For Al.
gorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMoRY L.J. 1025, 1128-29
(1990). See also David Bender, Software Protection: The 1985 Perspective, 7 W. NEW ENo.
L. REv. 405, 407 (1985) ("In [certain] respects . . . the program is unusual, if not
unique").
6. Allen Newell, Response: The Models Are Broken, The Models Are Broken! 47 U.
Prrr. L REv. 1023 (1986). Professor Newell's article is a response to Donald S. Chisum,
The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. Prrr. L REv. 959 (1986).
7. Since this Article will continually discuss "algorithms," and in particular "mathe-
matical algorithms," the term should be defined. However, the definition of an algorithm
has caused much confusion in patent law. See Michael C. Gemignani, Should Algorithms
Be Patentable?, 22 JnU Rcs J. 326, 326 (1982) ("No one can question that the notion
of an algorithm has given the US. Supreme Court no little trouble"). The definitional
problems are due in large part to the Supreme Courts decision in Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 US. 63 (1972), and the developments thereafter, and are more appropriately dis-
cussed in the algorithm and case-law analysis parts of this article. See infra text accom-
panying notes 82-89.
8. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
9. 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
10. 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
11. As will be discussed below, the Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Benson is the
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patents were obtained on what were essentially computer pro-
gramming concepts. While the patents used claim language re-
ferring to "apparatus," "systems," "methods," and the like, they
covered algorithms implemented on a computer to solve various
problems. These pertained to (1) the internal operation of the
computer, (2) information processing, and (3) computer interfac-
ing with "physical" processes, such as manufacturing.
This article explains how the Federal Circuit decisions in
Alappat, Warmerdam, and Lowry were essentially acknowledg-
ments of the current practice of patent practitioners in claiming
the invention as an application of the algorithm directed to a
specific device or apparatus, as opposed to the algorithm itself.
It argues that the time is ripe for the USPTO and the courts to
expand patent protection to algorithms and other computer pro-
gram-related inventions on a broader scale to keep pace with
technological advances. This will assure that deserving inven-
tors are afforded the benefits of patent protection, since it is ob-
vious that Congress will not be providing the direction in this
area that the USPTO and the courts had anticipated.
Part I provides an introduction to algorithms by defining
and demonstrating their practical applicability, discussing the
misleading effects of the Supreme Court's definition of them in
Gottschalk v. Benson, 2 and assessing the various methods of
protecting them as a form of intellectual property. Part H dis-
cusses the statutory subject matter requirements of patentabil-
ity for algorithms and computer program-related inventions andexamines the historical background of how the USPTO and the
courts interpreted them. Part III examines the Alappat,
Warmerdam, and Lowry decisions, and Part IV assesses their
impact on the claiming of algorithms and computer program-
related inventions, providing specific suggestions on how to
primary source for this nonpatentability rule. The rule was softened but not fundamen-
tally altered by the Supreme Courtes 1981 decision in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175
(1981). The rule is restated as Patent and Trademark Office policy. See U.S. PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFicE. MANuL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROcEDURS § 2110 (4th ed. 1979, rev.
1981). The rule is also repeated in books directed to the computer industry. See, eg., D.
REMEE LEGAL CARE FOR YOUR SOFTWKnZ 126-27 (1982):
Despite [Diamond v. Diehr], programmers have not been beating a path to the
Patent Office looking for protection. Why? Aside from the time and money con-
straints, most programmers want to be able to protect the very thing the Su-
preme Court has said is not protectable, namely, the algorithm .... Other
than rubber-curing programs [held patentable in Diehr] what software is pat-
entable? Because of the shaky state of the patent law regarding software, there
is no definitive answer...
12. 409 US. 63 (1972).
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draft claims -that will meet the statutory subject matter require-
ments as interpreted by the USPTO and the courts. The article
concludes that the Federal Circuit's recent decisions in Alappat,
Warmerdam, and Lowry are a continued expression of the Su-
preme Court's liberal views toward patentable subject matter
and algorithms in Diamond v. Diehr,13 allowing algorithms to be
patentable if they are reduced to some type of practical
application.
I. ALGORITHMS
A. Definition of Algorithms
Just what is an algorithm? 14 Prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Benson, there was no patent law definition of an al-
gorithm. Nevertheless, but for the nonpatentability rule of Ben-
son, there would be no need for such a definition.15 The litera-
ture on mathematics and computer science offers a number of
definitions of an algorithm that are different in their form, but
are mostly consistent in their substance. Given a problem, and a
device used to solve the problem, an algorithm is the precise
characterization of a method of solving the problem, presented
in a language comprehensible to the device. 16 Other definitions,
which are simple, broad and informal, include "a recipe or spe-
cific set of rules or directions for performing a task,"17 or "a set
13. 450 US. 175, 182 (1981) (holding that Congress intended patentable subject
matter to include 'everything under the sun that is made by man").
14. As to the origin of the term "algorithm,' see 1 DONALD KNtT, THE ART OF COM.
PTER PROGRMMING- FUNDAMENTAL ALoRrITHus 1 (2d ed. 1973):
The word did not appear in Webster's New World Dictionary as late as 1957; we
find only the older form "algorism" with its ancient meaning, i.e. the process of
doing arithmetic using Arabic numerals. In the middle ages, abacists computed
on the abacus and algorists computed by algorism. Following the middle ages,
the origin of this word was in doubt .... Finally, historians of mathematics
found the true origin of the word algorism: it comes from the name of a famous
Persian textbook author, Abu Ja'far Mohammed ibn Musa al-Khowarizmi (c.
825) .... Khowarizm is today the small Soviet city of hliva ....
Id. Gradually the form and meaning of "algorism" became corrupted; as explained by the
Oxford English Dictionary, the word was 'erroneously refashioned" by learned confusion!
with the word arithmetic. Tim OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 313 (2d ed. 1989).
15. Unfortunately, the Benson court used the general term "algorithm" when it re-
ferred to a specific type of algorithm, one that solved a mathematical problem. As a re-
sult, this case raised questions in subsequent appeals of rejections by the USPTO about
the meaning of the term algorithm.
16. ROBERT I. KORFHAGE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING 52
(1983).
17. MICHAEL MACHEY & PAUL YOUNG, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GENERAL THEORY OF
ALGoRmims 1 (1978).
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of formal directions for obtaining the required solution"18 An-
other definition which is more formal is as follows:
A method of solution for problem P on device M is a description in a lan-
guage comprehensible to M of discrete steps performable by M and an
ordering of these steps, such that given proper data, if M performs the
prescribed steps in the prescribed order, a solution to the problem P will
result, if one exists. A method of solution will be called a semi-algorithm
for P on M if the solution to P (if one exists) appears after the perform-
ance of finitely many steps. A semi-algorithm will be called an algorithm
if, in addition, whenever the problem has no solution the method enables
the device to determine this after a finite number of steps and halt.1
All computer program-related inventions are algorithms. An
algorithm may be expressed in different ways depending on the
device used to carry it out. The steps of an algorithm must be
written to be understood and executed by the device used. °
Where the device is a computer, the algorithm may be expressed
in the form of a computer program-related invention. The same
algorithm may be written for a human to carry out, but the lan-
guage used would be different. "While the algorithm, properly
formalized, may not be the only way to solve problems, it ap-
pears to be essentially the only way that the human intellect in
its present stage of development can comprehend. 20
The above definitions all come close to equating an al-
gorithm with a "process" in the patent sense of a sequence of
specifically defined operations to accomplish a useful result.
Five important features of an algorithm differentiate algorithms
from other concepts of problem solving (such as recipes,
processes, methods, techniques, procedure, or routines):
(1) Finiteness. An algorithm must always terminate after a finite number
of steps.
(2) Definiteness. Each step of an algorithm must be precisely defined; the
actions to be carried out must be rigorously and unambiguously specified
for each case.
(3) Input. An algorithm has zero or more inputs, i.e., quantities which
are given to it initially before the algorithm begins. These inputs are
taken from specified sets of objects.
(4) Output. An algorithm has one or more outputs, i.e., quantities which
have a specified relation to the inputs.
18. MARK A. AIsEaMAN, Er AL, LoGIc, AUTOMATA. AND ALGORiM 305 (1971).
19. ROBERT R. KORFHAGE, LOGIC AND ALGORITHMS WITH APPLICATIONS To THE COM-
PUTER AND INFORMATION SCIENCES 89 (1966). The author makes it clear that a "device
can include a human being. Id. at 91.
20. KORHAGE, supra note 16, at 53.
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(5) Effectiveness. An algorithm is also generally expected to be effective.
This means that all of the operations to be performed in the algorithm
must be sufficiently basic that they can in principle be done exactly and
in a finite length of time by a man using pencil and paper.21
Many algorithms also appear to have a recursive feature,
where one or more of the steps entails going back and repeating
one or more of the prior steps.22
B. Benson's Misleading Definition of Algorithms
In Benson, the Supreme Court recited a definition of an
algorithm:
A procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem is known
as an "algorithm.! The procedures set forth in the present claims are of
that kind; that is to say, they are a generalized formulation for programs
to solve mathematical problems of converting one form of numerical rep-
resentation to another. From the generic formulation, programs may be
developed as specific applications.23
The Court erred in two respects: (1) by implying that algo-
rithms relate to or solve only "mathematical problems", and (2)
in characterizing the method involved in Benson as directed to
"mathematical problems." It is indisputable that algorithms
21. KNt=r, supra note 14, at 4-6. By the reference to pencil and paper, this author
seems to assume that an algorithm is primarily for information or number processing.
Such is not necessarily the case. See infra note 23. Another work lists three "empirical
properties" that have been found to be present in all algorithms constructed so far.
(a) Determinacy The procedure is specified so clearly and precisely that there
is no room for arbitrary interpretation. A procedure of this kind can be commu-
nicated to another person by a finite number of instructions. The operations
described by these instructions do not depend on the whim of the operator and
constitute a determinate process which is completely independent of the person
carrying it out.
(b) Generality. An algorithm is applicable to more than just one specific prob-
lem: it is used for solving a class of problems, with the procedural instructions
valid for any particular set of initial data.
(c) Efficacy. This property, sometimes called the directionality of an algorithm,
means that application of an algorithmic procedure to any problem of a given
kind will lead to a 'stop' instruction in a finite number of steps, at which point
one must be able to find the required solution.
ATEMAN, supra note 18, at 308-09.
22. For a discussion of the theoretical associations of recursiveness with algorithms,
see MAcn-sY & YOUNG, supra note 17, at 2 ("[AIl evidence indicates that the class of
partial recursive functons is exactly the class of effectively computable functions; that
is, that the partial recursive fictions are exactly the functions which can be computed
by finite procedures, algorithms, or computer programs.")
23. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972).
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often are devised in order to solve problems of a mathematical
nature.2 Algorithms, however, may also be devised to solve all
sorts of non-mathematical problems.2 The method at issue in
Benson meets all of the above definitions of an algorithm (in-
cluding the five features). However, is the method one for solv-
ing a "mathematical problem" as the Court states? The Court
held that the claimed method would wholly preempt a mathe-
matical formula, and would in effect be a patent on an idea,
which would make the method unpatentable. Unfortunately, the
Court used the general term algorithm to refer to a specific type
of algorithm, one that solved a "mathematical problem." The im-
precision of the Court in characterizing the algorithm before it
in Benson created uncertainty as to the scope of the exclusion-
ary rule that it upholds26 and led to many questions in subse-
quent appeals of rejections by the USPTO about the meaning of
the term algorithm.27
24. Perhaps the most famous is the algorithm derived from Euclid for finding the
greatest common divisor of two positive integers a and b. One text relates the algorithm
as follows:
(1) Compare a and b (a = b, or a < b, or a > b). Go on to 2.
(2) If a = b then either is the greatest common divisor. Stop the computation. If
a not = b go on to 3.
(3) Subtract the smaller from the larger number and write down the subtra-
hend and the remainder. Go to the next instruction.
(4) Assign symbol a to the subtrahend, and symbol b to the remainder. Return
to direction L
The procedure is repeated until a = b. Then the computation is stopped.
AumSEAN, supra note 18, at 306.
25. The literature gives some simple examples of nonmathematical algorithms. See
Niklaus Wirth, Data Structures and Algorithms, 251 ScL AM. 65 (1984):
The first algorithms were invented to solve numerical problems such as multi-
plying numbers, finding the greatest common divisor, calculating trigonometric
functions and so on. Today non-numerical algorithms are of equal importance;
.they have been devised for tasks such as finding the smallest element in a se-
quence, searching for a given word in a text, scheduling events and sorting
data into some specified order.
Id. See also KODRHAGE, supra note 16, at 91 (giving an algorithm for "travers[ing] a sim-
ple maze without loops"); GOODMAN, supra note 4, at 153 n.32 (giving an algorithm for a
"safe procedure for lifting a cup of coffee off a saucer").
26. See, ag., In re Toma, 575 F.2d 872, 875 (C.C.P. 1978) (method for "translation
between source and target natural languages using a programmable digital computer
system7 did not involve a "mathematical algorithm" in the Benson sense); In re Freeman,
573 F2d 1237, 1246-47 (C.C.P. 1978) (computer-based control system for typesetting
alphanumeric information, including mathematical symbols, is not an algorithm in the
Benson sense; even though the applicant himself characterized his invention as a "local
positioning algorithm," the claimed method contained "no mathematical calculations,
equations, or formulae").
27. See discussion infra part IIL
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C. Protection of Algorithms
Protection for computer program-related inventions, which
always consist of algorithms, is available through copyrights,
trade secrets, and patents. Each form affords the inventor
unique protections, but the specific remedial protections that
patents provide has made it the preferential form of protection.
1. Copyrights. Copyrights afford computer program-related
inventions only limited protection. A copyright protects only the
expression of an idea, not the idea itself.2 For example, the Su-
preme Court has held that a copyrighted book did not protect
the author's novel bookkeeping system, but only prevented the
unauthorized copying of his expression of these ideas-the book
itself.29 Thus, a copyright would protect computer program-
related inventions against unauthorized copying of the program
steps but would not prevent another computer programmer from
developing a different program that employs the same algorithm
to accomplish the same result. Furthermore, because copyrights
prevent only the unauthorized copying of the program steps,
they fail to afford a remedy against one who independently au-
thors a similar work,30 or who copies the original work with sub-
stantial changes in it.31 Due to these limitations, copyrights do
not adequately protect programs employed in computer pro-
gram-related inventions. Patents, on the other hand, specifically
28. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-03 (1879).
29. Id. at 104. Congress codified this concept in 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994), which
states that copyright protection does not "extend to any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."
30. See, eg., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903)
(stating that there is no copyright infringement if one paints an identical portrait using
the same model; but one is not free to copy another's portrait); R. Dakin & Co. v. Charles
Offset Co., 441 F. Supp. 434, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that plaintiff is entitled to re-
covery for copyright infringement upon a prima facie showing of copying and absent
defendant's showing of independent creation); Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F.
145, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (stating that one who independently writes or composes the
precise combination of copyrighted words or notes is not guilty of copyright infringe-
ment). See also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (setting forth the exclusive rights granted to authors). In
other words, copyrights can be thought of as requiring only "originality" whereas patents
must be not only "original"-not copied-but also 'novel." Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994)
with 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). Therefore, one must be the first inventor of the subject mat-
ter sought to be patented.
3L Copyright infringement requires actual appropriation of language, see Baker v.
Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1879), or substantial similarity to the original work, see
Gross v. Seligman, 212 F. 930, 931-32 (2d Cir. 1914).
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protect an invention's underlying concept.32 Although the dura-
tion of patent protection is much shorter than that of a copy-
right, the scope of the subject matter protected is broader.
2. Trade Secrets. A trade secret can consist of "any
formula, pattern, device, or compilation of information which is
used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use
[the secret]." 3 Trade secret protection prevents unauthorized
disclosure or use of information that has been made available
only in confidence.3 However, the proprietor of a trade secret
has an adequate remedy for unauthorized use of the trade se-
cret only if there has been some misappropriation; for example,
if the secret was stolen5 or if a confidential relationship or con-
tract was breached. 6 There is no remedy if the technology is ap-
propriated through lawful means, such as independent discov-
32. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. at 102-03. Section 101 defines the scope of subject
matter protected by patents. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994); see Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584,
593-94. Section 101 of the Patent Act provides: "Whoever invents or discovers any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
33. RwFrATEmENT OF Toms § 757 comment b (1939). State and federal courts have
adopted the Restatement definition of a trade secret even though the second Restate-
ment of Torts no longr includes any trade secret provisions. See, eg., Aronson v. Quick
Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 266 (1979) (stating that "the most commonly accepted
definition of trade secrets is restricted to confidential information which is not disclosed
in the normal process of exploitation" and citing the Restatement's definition of a trade
secret); University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 535 (5th
Cir. 1974) (upholding a finding that a computer program was within the Restatements
definition of a trade secret).
The UNWF. TAADE SEcRETs Aar, 14 UL.A § 1(4) (1986), defines the kind of information
that can constitute a trade secret:
[Ilnformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, ac-
tual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily as-
certainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
Id. Clearly, computer software would be eligible for trade secret protection in view of the
Uniform Trade Secret Act's direct reference to a "program," "technique," or 'process See
Aronson, 440 US. at 264-66 (upholding the validity of trade secret protection).
34. See Aronson, 440 U.S. at 266; RESrATEMENT OF ToR's § 757 comment b (1939).
35. See, eg., E.L duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th
Cia), cert denied, 400 US. 1024 (1970); RESTATEMENT OF ToR's § 757 comment f (1939).
36. See, eg., Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 376 (7th Cia 1953); Harkobusic v.
General Am. Transp. Corp., 209 F. Supp. 128, 129 (W.D. Pa. 1962); Furr's Inc. v. United
Specialty Advertising Co., 338 S.W.2d 762, 765-66 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
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ery,3 7 reverse engineering, 8 or divulgence by the trade secret
holder without maintaining confidentiality.39 In contrast, a pat-
ent owner receives an exclusive right to prevent others from
making, using, or selling the invention if the patent owner can
show that the inventor was the first inventor of the technology
patented. 40 The patent holder therefore has an adequate remedy
even if a subsequent inventor independently develops the same
invention.
3. Patent& Patent protection particularly appeals to devel-
opers of computer program-related inventions.41 A patent pro-
vides protection for the concept of an invention unlike a copy-
right which merely protects the expression of the underlying
concept.42 A patent allows the holder to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the invention for seventeen years.43
The patent holder is also protected against anyone who indepen-
dently but subsequently develops the same invention." A patent
affords the owner of a computer program-related invention with
adequate remedies for infringement.45 A patent owner must sim-
37. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974); E.I. duPont, 431 F.2d
at 1015.
38. Kewanee, 416 US. at 476; E.L duPont, 431 F.2d at 1015. The Supreme Court
has described reverse engineering as "starting with the known product and working
backward to divine the process which aided in its development or manufacture."
Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 476.
39. E.L duPont, 431 F.2d at 1014-15.
40. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). This section requires that an invention be "novel" in
order to be patented and describes ways in which rights to a patent can be lost.
41. See DAVID BENDFR COMPUTER LAw: SoFTWARE PROTECTION 3-1 (1986) (stating
that patent protection is useful if a computer-related invention's value resides in its al-
gorithm). Some commentators, however, have expressed doubts about whether the pat-
ent system can adequately protect computer programs. See, ag., Michael C. Gemignani,
Legal Protection for Computer Software: The View From '79, 7 RUTGERs COMPUTER &
TEcH. LJ. 269, 301-12 (1980); But see, Arthur J. Keeffe & Terry G. Mahn, Protecting
Software: Is It Worth All the T-ouble?, 62 ABA J. 906, 907 (1976Xarguing for a "federal
trade secret law" which would protect authors of software programs like "patent and
copyright laws now do for most other types of intellectual property).
42. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
43. 35 U.S.C. § 154(aX2) (1994).
44. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1994).
45. Patent infringement involves the unauthorized making, using, or selling of a
patented invention within the territorial boundaries of the United States during the
term of the patent. 35 US.C. § 271(a) (1994 & Supp. I 1995). A patent holder may sue
an infringer for relief in the appropriate federal court, id. § 141, and ask the court for
an injunction to prevent continued infringement and an award of damages. Id. §§ 283-
284. The accused infringer may raise the defense of patent invalidity or non-infringe-
ment. A court will not find infringement unless the defendant's alleged infringing activi-
ties fall within the scope of the patent claim. See, eg., Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson
& Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1457-58 (Fed. Cir. 1984); ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Monteflore
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ply show that the infringer made, used, or sold something that
fell within the scope of a patent claim.46 Because patent protec-
tion provides absolute ownership rights, the owner need not
prove unauthorized copying, as is the case with copyrights, 47 nor
misappropriation, as is required under trade secret law. 8 The
patent laws provide a remedy by civil action and afford damages
designed to compensate the patent holder for infringement.4 9
Congress has expressly permitted the licensing of patents,
rendering patent protection not only useful, but also profitable.50
Assuming a computer program-related invention is entitled to
patent protection under the statutory requirements of the Pat-
ent Act, patents provide protection that is superior to either cop-
yright or trade secret protection.
II. PATENT PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER PROGRAM-RELATED
INVENTIONS
A. Statutory Subject Matter-35 US.C. § 101
To obtain a patent, an applicant must establish that the
subject matter of the invention falls within one of the four stat-
utory categories of invention defined in Section 101 of the Pat-
ent Act of 1952: "[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a pat-
ent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title."51 The categories include a new use of a known process,
Hosp., 732 E2d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
46. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-09 (1950).
47. See supra text accompanying notes 28-3L
48. See supra notes text accompanying notes 33-36.
49. 35 U.S.C. §§ 281, 284 (1994) (providing for "no ... less than a reasonable roy-
alty for the use made of the invention by the ifinger").
50. See id. § 261 (indicating that patents have the attributes of personal property
and, therefore, can be freely assigned or conveyed); see also id. § 271(dX2) (condoning
the use of licensing agreements).
51. 35 US.C. § 101 (1994). As the Supreme Court has stated, "[N~o patent is availa-
ble for a discovery, however useful, novel, and nonobvious, unless it falls within one of
the express categories of patentable subject matter of 35 U.S.C. § 101." Kewanee Oil Co.
v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974). The invention in addition must be novel and
must meet the nonobviousness requirement set forth in Section 103. According to that
section, an invention may not be patented 'if the differences between the subject matter
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordi-
nary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains! 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994). The
test for the presence of nonobviousness is three-part; the level of ordinary skill and the
scope of the prior art must be determined; the differences between the claims at issue
1997]
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machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.52 If
an invention does not fall within one of the categories in Section
101, it is not patentable.
A process is an act or series of acts which produces a de-
sired result. In Cochrane v. Deener,53 the Supreme Court set
forth a classic definition of "process."54 A machine is a device
that has relatively moveable parts and performs a useful opera-
tion. Proper statutory claims may include those drawn to the
machine itself, to a part of a machine or to a new combination
of well-known elements. An article of manufacture is generally
defined as any tangible object, other than a machine or composi-
tion of matter, that is man-made and not found in substantially
the same form in nature.55 Mere printed matter does not qualify
as statutory subject matter under Section 101.56 Most computer
program-related invention claims have been drafted either as a
process describing a set of actions to be performed on or by spe-
cific combinations of means plus function elements, or as a com-
ponent of a new machine, in order to satisfy the requirement of
Section 101.57
The use of the phrase "whoever invents" in Section 101 re-
quires that the claimed invention be man-made, and lays the
foundation for the doctrine that phenomena of nature, mental
processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patenta-
ble.58 Under this theory, discoveries of scientific principles are
not patentable. 9 "The rule that the discovery of a law of nature
and the prior art must be ascertained; and then the obviousness of those differences to a
person of ordinary skill must be decided. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17
(1966). The ordinary skill is not that of a layman but that of a person reasonably skilled
in the art. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 229 (1976) (quoting Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 37 (1966)).
52. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1994).
53. 94 US. 780 (1876).
54. Id. at 788 ("A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a
given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be
transformed and reduced to a different state or thing).
55. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 US. 303 (1981).
56. See, eg., In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
57. See 35 US.C. § 112 (1994), which provides:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step
for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or
acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corre-
sponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and
equivalents thereof
Id.
58. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981); Paine, Webber, Inc. v. Merrill
Lynch, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1366 (D.Del. 1983).
59. For the classic illustration of the distinction between discovery and invention
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cannot be patented rests, not on the notion that natural phe-
nomena are not processes, but rather on the more fundamental
understanding that they are not the kind of 'discoveries' that
the statute was enacted to protect. 60 The courts have applied
this rule in excluding a number of subject-matter areas from
protection under Section 101, including principles or laws of na-
ture,61 ideas,62 mathematical expressions of scientific truths,63
see MacKay Radio and Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939). For ex-
ample, Benjamin Franklin's recognition of the electrical nature of lightning was a discov-
ery, whereas his application of the discovery in the form of the lightning rod was an
invention.
60. Parker v. Flook, 437 US. 584, 593 (1978).
61. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). In
Funk, the Supreme Court held that the discovery that certain strains of bacteria could
be mixed without harmful effect to their properties was merely the handiwork of nature
and was therefore unpatentable. Id. The Court stated:
The qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun, electricity, or the qual-
ities of metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men. They are
manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to
none. He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature has no
claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be invention
from such a discovery, it must come from the application of the law of nature
to a new and useful end.
Id. See O'Reilley v. Morse, 56 US. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853) (stating that a claim directed
to the use of electromagnetism without regard to the particular process disclosed in the
application is not itself patentable subject matter). Thus, for example:
A new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not
patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated
law that E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity. Such dis-
coveries are 'manifestations of... nature, free to all men and reserved exclu-
sively to none."
Diamond v. Chalrabarty, 447 US. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting Funk, 333 US. at 130). The
application of a law of nature or a mathematical formula to a process or structure, how-
ever, may be patentable. Diamond, 450 U.S. at 187-88; The Telephone Cases, 126 US. 1,
534 (1888) (finding that Alexander Graham Bell's claims were not an attempt to patent
all telephonic uses of electricity).
62. See generally Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 US. (20 Wall.) 498, 507
(1874) (stating that an idea itself is not patentable, but a new device in which the idea
is put to use may be patented); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 174-75 (1852)
(stating that a mere principle, however novel, may not be the subject of a patent; the in-
vention must consist of a practical application and serve some useful purpose); In re
Bolongaro, 62 F.2d 1059, 1060 (C.C.P.A. 1933) (holding that a method of producing
printed publications from manuscripts is nonpatentable subject matter); Nippon Elec.
Glass Co. v. Sheldon, 539 F. Supp. 542, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (stating that applicant's dis-
covery that x-radiation in excess of .04 millirems per hour given off by television sets is
harmful to human beings is an idea that cannot be patented); see also Mitchell P. Novick
& Helene Walfenstein, The Algorithm and Computer Software Patentability: A Scientific
View of a Legal Problem, 7 RtrGERS COMPUTERS & TEcIm L.J. 313, 316-17 (1980) (explain-
ing that a process consisting only of mental steps is not patentable).
63. See generally Diamond, 450 U.S. at 186 (1981) (stating that an "algorithm, or
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and printed matter."'
Thus, if the computer program is viewed as a series of
thought processes or as a mathematical algorithm, then it
merely consists of mental steps that are not statutory subject
matter under Section 101. This was the scenario in the early
prosecution of patent claims for computer programs. With the
burgeoning of the computer industry in the early 1960s, Presi-
dent Lyndon Johnson set up a committee5 to address the pat-
entability of computer programs and to suggest statutory revi-
sions to the Patent Act, which proclaimed that:
The Patent Office now cannot examine applications for programs because
of the lack of a classification technique and the requisite search files.
Even if these were available, reliable searches would not be feasible or
economic because of the tremendous volume of prior art being generated.
Without this search, the patenting of programs would be tantamount to
mere registration and the presumption of validity would be all but
nonexistent.6
mathematical formula, is like a law of nature, which cannot be the subject of a patent");
Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. RCA, 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1938) (stating that *[w]hile a scientific
truth, or the mathematical expression of it is not a patentable invention, a novel and
useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be"
patentable.).
64. See generally In re Miller, 418 F.2d 1392, 1396 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (stating that
"printed matter by itself is not patentable subject matter"); In re Russell 48 F.2d 668,
669 (C.C.P.A. 1931) (stating that "[the mere arrangement of printed matter on a sheet
or sheets of paper, in book form or otherwise, does not constitute any new and useful
art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter' (quoting 35 US.C. § 31 (1926) (cur-
rent version at 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)))); Boggs v. Robertson, 13 US.P.Q. (BNA) 214, 215
(D.D.C. 1931) (stating that printed matter that is independent from the object on which
it is arranged is merely an idea reduced to writing and not a manufacture); Ex parte
Des Granges, 142 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 41, 42 (PTO Board of Appeals 1962) (stating that pat-
entability cannot be based solely on printed matter). The copyright laws provide protec-
tion for printed matter. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
Although printed matter itself cannot be patented, certain forms of printed matter
can be combined with a physical structure to create patentable subject matter. See, ag.,
In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that printed matter consisting of
printed digits arranged on an underlying band to allow the user to generate prime num-
bers and perform numerical tricks is functionally related to structural components of the
invention and therefore constitutes patentable subject matter); Ex parte Schott, 142
US.P.Q. (BNA) 281, 283 (PTO Board of Appeals 1963) (stating that printed matter on a
slide rule produced a new functional relationship and therefore constituted patentable
subject matter).
65. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, 'To PRoMoT THE PROGRESS OF
... USEFUL ARTS': IN AN AGE OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY (1966) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION REPORT].
66. Id. at 13.
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The commission's report 67 recommended that computer pro-
grams be expressly denied patent protection due to the USPTO's
lack of adequate facilities and personnel to classify and process
such patents.68 In turn, the USPTO's 1968 guidelines estab-
lished that computer programs would not be considered patenta-
ble subject matter.6
B. Case Law Developments Concerning the Classification of
Computer Program-Related Inventions as Statutory Subject
Matter
1. Early Doctrine. The USPTO's early decisions denied pat-
ent protection to computer program-related inventions on the
basis of the so-called "mental steps doctrine,"70 as embraced by
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)71 in the case
of In re Abrams.72 According to that doctrine, any process that
consists entirely of mentally executable ideas or operations is
not patentable subject matter.73
67. Id. at 5.
68. Id. at 12. The Commission further addressed the issue of subject matter patent-
ability for computer-related inventions, stating-
Uncertainty now exists as to whether the state permits a valid patent to be
granted on programs. Direct attempts to patent programs have been rejected
on the ground of nonstatutory subject matter. Indirect attempts to obtain pat-
ents and avoid the rejection, by drafting claims as a process, or a machine or
components thereof programmed in a given manner, rather than as a program
itself, have confused the issue further and should not be permitted.
Id. at 13.
69. See Examination of Patent Applications on Computer Programs, 33 Fed. Reg.
15,609-10 (1968), rescinded by 34 Fed. Re 15,724 (1969).
70. See generally Norman D. McClaskey, The MentalProcess Doctrine: Its Origin,
Legal Basis, and Scope, 55 IOwA L. REV. 1149 (1970); Katharine P. Ambrose, Comment,
The Mental Steps Doctrine, 48 TENN. L. REV. 903 (1981). The mental steps doctrine has
traditionally been the basis for denying patent protection for claims drawn to pure meth-
ods of calculation and mathematical formulae. See, eg., Lyman v. Ladd, 347 F.2d 482,
483 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (stating that applicant's discovery of a specific relationship between
the frequently of a spring suspension element and the gravity induced rate of downward
movement of the mechanical elements of the system cannot be the basis for patentabil-
ity); In re Shao Wen Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 379-80 (C.C.PJ.A 1951) (stating that pure
mental steps for computing the profile of an airfoil are outside the scope of
patentability).
7L The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has adopted as pre-
cedent the holdings of the CCPA and the Court of Claims and has announced that it will
not be bound by the decisions of the other circuit courts. See South Corp. v. United
States, 690 F2d 1368, 1371 (Fed Cir. 1982) (en banc).
72. 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.PRA 1951).
73. See Shao Wen Yuan, 188 F.2d at 379-80.
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The mental steps doctrine was an obstacle to the patentabil-
ity of computer programs. Because a computer program can be
thought of as a series of steps for solving a particular problem,
it can be thought of as an algorithm.74 Moreover, if the steps in-
volved mathematical calculations, constituting a mathematical
algorithm, it was feared that a patent on the program would be
a patent on the algorithm itself, which would wholly preempt
the mathematical algorithm, remove it from the public domain,
and leave it with no other practical application.7 5 This would
seem to be contradictory to the exclusionary rule that laws of
nature, scientific principles, and mathematical formulas could
not be patented.76
The USPTO applied the "mental steps doctrine" throughout
the 1960s. However, the CCPA began to overturn some of the
"mental step" legal barriers to patenting computer-software in-
ventions, replacing them with what Mr. Justice Stevens later re-
ferred to disapprovingly as "more expansive principles formu-
lated with computer technology in mind. 7 7 The CCPA
disapproved the "mental steps doctrine" as not being sufficient
to answer the complex questions in In re Prater,78 and concluded
that the precedents for the doctrine had been poorly reasoned or
misinterpreted. The Prater Court held that although purely
mental steps may not be patentable, a process disclosed as being
a sequence or combination of steps, capable of performance
without mental steps and directed to a category of invention de-
fined in Section 101, may be entitled to a patent even though
the process could alternatively be carried out by mental steps.
After Prater, the USPTO could no longer use the mental steps
doctrine as a basis for denying a patent for a computer program
embodying a mathematical algorithm, despite the fact that such
a program could be executed through mental calculations.
In In re Bernhart,79 the CCPA recognized that a computer
run by a new and unobvious program differed physically from
the computer itself, and suggested that claims drawn to a ma-
chine, one of the categories of subject matter listed in Section
101, rather than just the programming steps, could be used to
protect computer programs, since the steps were performed by a
74. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text for the definition of an algorithm.
75. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972).
76. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
77. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 200 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.PA. 1969), modified on reh'g, 415 F.2d 1393 (1969).
79. 417 F2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
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machine and therefore were not mental.80 This case left little
doubt that the "mental steps doctrine" was not applicable to
computer program-related inventions except when an allowed
patent claim would prohibit all uses of a scientific principle or
mathematical equation."'
In response to the USPTO's practice of using the "mental
steps doctrine," the CCPA developed the "technological arts"
test. This held that method or process claims which could be
performed on a programmable computer or which were other-
wise in the "technological arts" were patentable subject matter
because they were not "purely mental." 2 Under this test, the
court presumes that applicants for a patent have established a
prima facie case that the subject matter of the inventor's appli-
cation discloses a technical apparatus that implements a
process.83
2. Supreme Court Intervention. After the CCPA chipped
away at the "mental steps doctrine," the Supreme Court took up
the challenge of the CCPA's new position in 1972 in the case of
Gottschalk v. Benson.84 The Court focused the debate away from
the technological arts and substituted an inquiry into the under-
lying algorithm utilized in the program and its connection with
other physical or mechanical processes that might be the end
product of the invention.
In Benson, the CCPA reversed the USPTO's denial of patent
protection for Benson's method of converting numerical informa-
tion from binary-coded decimal numbers into binary numbers,
which could then be used to program a computer. The Supreme
Court, deciding that the claimed programming algorithn was
not a "process" as defined by the Patent Act,85 reversed the
CCPA. The Court reasoned that an algorithm, or mathematical
formula, is analogous to a law of nature.8 6 It then applied the
80. Id. at 1400; see also In re Foster, 438 F.2d 1011, 1016 (C.C..A. 1971) (stating
that a computer run by a particular program has its memory elements arranged differ-
ently than the same computer run by a different program).
81. See Bernhart, 417 F.2d at 1399. The court noted that the apparatus and method
claims at issue could only be infringed by a digital computer and therefore could not pos-
sibly prohibit all uses of a scientific principle or mathematical equation. Id at 1399-401.
82. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970). The test was reafrmed in In re
Foster, 438 F.2d 1011 (C.C.PJ.. 1971).
83. See Robert 0. Nimitz, Development of the Law of Computer Software Protection,
61 J. PAT. OFF. Soty 3 (1979).
84. 409 US. 63 (1972).
85. Id. at 64.
86. 1& at 67.
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established rule that a law of nature may not be the subject of a
patent and denied patent protection for Benson's invention.
87
Noting that the applicant's process claim was "so abstract and
sweeping" that it covered all known and unknown uses of the
claimed conversion with no specified end use,8 the Court found
that the mathematical formula had no other practical applica-
tion except for its use in a general purpose computer.8 9 As a re-
sult, the Supreme Court refused to affirm the CCPA's determi-
nation of patentability. The Court reasoned that a process claim
may not be granted patent protection when the process "would
wholly preempt the mathematical formula and in practical effect
would be a patent on the algorithm itself,"90 and that the discov-
ery of preexisting natural law does not give the discoverer "the
right to exclude others from enjoying the benefits derived from
the operation of those natural laws."91 The Court was careful to
mention that it did not intend to disqualify all computer pro-
grams from patent protection.92 It simply means that a process
claim which contains a mathematical formula cannot be drawn
so broadly that it covers all uses, known and unknown, of the
formula.93 To be patentable, an algorithm must have a specific
application to a new and useful end.94
The Supreme Court again responded in Parker v. Flook.95
Flook's program instructed a computer to periodically measure
the process variables used in the catalytic conversion of hydro-
carbons and employed a previously undiscovered mathematical
formula to continually update the allowable limits on those vari-
ables, constituting a category of useful, though conventional,
87. Specifically, the Court stated: "He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenome-
non of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be
invention from such a discovery, it must come from the application of the law of nature
to a new and useful end." Id. (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333
US. 127, 130 (1948)).
88. 409 U.S. at 68.
89. Id. at 71.
90. Id. at 72. The Court defined an algorithm as a "procedure for solving a given
type of mathematical problem," which, like a law of nature, could not be considered pat-
entable subject matter. Id. at 65; see supra note 7.
91. 409 US. at 67.
92. See id. at 72-73.
93. Id. at 68.
94. The Court later expressly limited its holding to the facts in Benson in Dann v.
Johnson, 425 US. 219 (1976), where the application failed on obviousness grounds and
the subject matter issue was not reached. In light of Dann, the CCPA subsequently
recharacterized patentable software claims as claims for a larger apparatus or process in
which software was only part of the invention.
95. 437 US. 584 (1978).
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post-solution activity. 6
The USPTO denied the reasoning in Flook's claims that the
only difference from the prior art was the new mathematical
formula used for updating. Flook argued that the program did
not preempt all use of the algorithm and, under the guide of
Benson, should be allowed. The CCPA agreed with Flook and re-
versed the PTO rejection.97
The Supreme Court, however, denied Flook's claims, broad-
ened its preemption approach taken in Benson, and reaffirmed
its definition of algorithm. The Court said that even though
Flook did not attempt to preempt all use of his formula, the
formula was the only novel portion of Flook's process. Using the
figures computed to adjust limits did not make the process pat-
entable.98 The Court also stated that if the program output is
only used to send the results of a calculation to an operator or
screen, tying that activity to a specific end use was merely a
recitation of insignificant post-solution activity and thus not pat-
entable. In rejecting Flook's claims, the Supreme Court used
what has been called the "point of novelty" approach,99 under
which claims do not constitute patentable subject matter if the
only difference between the applicant's claims and the prior art
resided in a mental operation or an otherwise nonstatutory
element.
Flook made it extremely difficult to patent processes imple-
mented by software. Even if a program did not preempt all use
of the formula, as in Benson, if the claim included only post-so-
lution activity, such as the output of data, the claim would not
be patentable. The confusion resulting from the dual definition
of the term "algorithm" was prevalent in the decisions of the
USPTO and the CCPA. The USPTO tended to hold that a com-
puter program expressed in numerical terms was not proper
96. Post-solution activity can be described as the steps in a process claim following
the solution of the algorithm.
97. In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21, 23 (C.C.PA. 1977), rev'd, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
98. Fook, 437 U.S. 584.
99. The Court summarized the "point of novelty" approach as follows:
Respondents process is unpatentable under [Section] 101, not because it con-
tains a mathematical algorithm as one component, but because once that al-
gorithm is assumed to be within the prior art, the application, considered as a
whole, contains no patentable invention. Even though a phenomenon of nature
or mathematical formula may be well known, an inventive application of the
principle may be patented. Conversely, the discovery of such a phenomenon




statutory subject matter because the program was inherently an
algorithm. The CCPA, however, repeatedly reversed the PTO
and ordered such patents to issue.1°°
3. The Freeman-Walter Test. Following a period of extreme
confusion, the CCPA took control and attempted to formulate
some concrete criteria for the processing of software claims. The
CCPA attempted to reconcile the nature of the algorithm with
the claim as a whole by applying the "point of novelty" test, and
with the procedure afforded most other scientific processes in a
patent application.
The new test became known as the Freeman-Walter two-
step test since it was originally set forth in In re Freeman,101 de-
cided before Flook, and then modified and put into a form for
use in In re Walter,0 2 a case decided after Flook:
First the claim is analyzed to determine whether a mathematical al-
gorithm is directly or indirectly recited. Next, if a mathematical al-
gorithm is found, the claim as a whole is further analyzed to determine
if the mathematical algorithm is implemented in a specific manner to de-
fine structural relationships between the physical elements of the claim
(in apparatus claims) or to refine or limit the claim's steps (in process
claims). If it does, the claim is statutory subject matter. If, however, the
mathematical algorithm is merely presented and solved by the claimed
invention and is not applied in any manner to the physical elements or
process steps, no amount of post-solution activity nor limited field of use
will render the claim statutory'03
In Freeman, the CCPA began to develop its own two-
pronged test to determine whether a claim embodying mathe-
matical computations or algorithms constituted proper statutory
subject matter under Section 101. The first prong requires the
examiner to determine whether the claim at issue directly or in-
directly recites an "algorithm" as defined in the Benson sense of
that term.1°4 If the claim does not recite such an algorithm, it
100. See, eg., In re Application of Toma, 575 F.2d 872 (C.C-PA 1978); In re Phillips,
608 E2d 879 (C.C.PA 1979).
101. 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P-.A 1978).
102. 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.PA 1980).
103. In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 915 (C.CP.A. 1982).
104. 573 F.2d at 1245. The Benson Court restricted its consideration to a procedure
for solving a given type of mathematical problem (ie. mathematical algorithms) as op-
posed to the broader definition of the term algorithm that includes nonmathematical
step-by-step procedures for solving a problem or accomplishing some end. See Benson,
409 U.S. at 65; Freeman, 573 F.2d at 1245. The CCPA reasoned that every process can
be characterized as a step-by-step procedure for accomplishing some useful end. Unless
Benson concerned itself with only mathematical algorithms, the Court necessarily would
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could not "wholly preempt" the algorithm as the Benson Court
feared, and as a result, would fall within a statutory category of
invention. If the claim does recite an algorithm, the second
prong requires the examiner to further scrutinize the claim in
order to determine whether the claim, in its entirety, "wholly
preempts" the algorithm. 1 5 Only if the claim satisfies both parts
of this analysis would the Benson rule apply, dictating rejection
of the claim as being drawn to nonstatutory subject matter.10 6
Thus, if a patent applicant could show that his claims did not
recite an algorithm or, if one was recited, that the claim would
not exclude the public from all uses of that algorithm, then the
claim would constitute patentable subject matter.
The second prong of the Freeman test posed a problem of in-
terpretation-when did a claim "wholly preempt" the algorithm?
Judge Giles Rich of the Federal Circuit, while serving on the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, clarified the second step
of the analysis in Walter, stating that a claim will fall within
Section 101 and constitute patentable subject matter if the
mathematical algorithm defines structural relationships be-
tween the physical elements in an apparatus claim or refines or
limits claim steps in a process claim.10 7 If, on the other hand,
the claimed invention merely presents and solves the mathemat-
ical algorithm, as in Benson and Flook, without applying it to
physical elements or process steps, no amount of post-solution
activity will render the claim statutory, nor will it be saved by
merely reciting the intended use of the mathematical algorithm
in the preamble of the claim.10 Thus, the CCPA harmonized the
Freeman-Walter test with the Flook decision, which held that an
otherwise nonstatutory claim cannot be transformed into patent-
able subject matter by merely setting forth some token post-
solution activity.
Thus, the preemption approach of Benson was given a nar-
row interpretation and the end-use test was broadened. The
Freeman-Walter test offered a more refined approach to Section
101 statutory subject matter analysis than prior formulations.
Pursuant to this approach, the "point of novelty" test is properly
have had to reach the absurd result of reading the word "process" out of Section 101. Id.
at 1246.
105. Id. at 1245. The court held that Freeman's claims never reached the second
step because they did not recite an "algorithm" in the Benson sense; they failed to set
forth "a procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem" Id. at 1245 (quot-
ing Benson, 409 U.S. at 65 (emphasis added)).
106. 573 F.2d at 1245.




considered only after a finding of statutory subject matter is
made, not before. As such, although a computer program may be
recognized as patentable, it must nevertheless meet the same
requirements as other inventions in order to qualify for patent
protection.
In Diamond v. Diehr,10 9 the Supreme Court finally sided
with the CCPA and endorsed this approach. This decision also
marked the first time the Court recognized a computer program-
related invention including a mathematical formula or al-
gorithm within the claimed method as being patentable subject
matter. Diehr applied for a patent on a process for molding rub-
ber which ensured that the rubber would always be perfectly
cured by utilizing a computer operated program to take constant
measurements of the temperature of the mold and apply a
known formula to constantly recalculate the remaining cure
time. When the computer calculated the remaining cure time to
be zero, it automatically opened the mold press. Diehr did not
attempt to claim patent protection for the formula itself;10 he
claimed the improved process for curing rubber."' In a five to
four decision, the Court endorsed the claimed innovation as an
improved industrial process, even though it required the use of
a digital computer." 2 Since Diehr only attempted to patent the
total process and not the formula, algorithm or method of calcu-
lation, the Court held that the presence of the formula and the
corresponding computer solution did not destroy the statutory
subject matter of the process as a whole. Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, stated that even if a patent claim for a
process contains a mathematical formula, it will satisfy the sub-
ject matter requirements of Section 101 if the process, when
considered as a whole, implements or applies the formula to
perform a function which the patent laws were designed to
protect. 113
The Court also reaffirmed its view regarding the meaning of
the word algorithm and again rejected the computer software-al-
gorithm approach. This is made evident by a comparison of
Flook and Diehr. The claims allowed in Diehr are quite similar
to the ones disallowed in Flook. However, the reason the Diehr
claims were allowed is not because the Court accepted the com-
puter science definition of algorithm over its previously accepted
109. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
110. Id. at 181.
111. Id. at 191.
112. Id. at 185-93.
113. Id. at 192.
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classical mathematical definition, but rather because in Flook,
the only new element was the use of a program to calculate tim-
ing that was previously calculated by hand. In Diehr, there had
been no such previous capability in the prior art of measuring
temperature with precision. Thus, the Diehr analysis seems to
be more in line with the statutory requirements of Sections 101,
102 and 103, and the treatment given other inventions under
these sections.
Diehr did not explicitly open the door for the patenting of
computer programs. Instead, the case established that in in-
stances when a patentable process or apparatus contains a com-
puter program as one of its elements, the process or apparatus
is not rendered unpatentable by the presence of that program. It
also established that patent claims drawn to a computer pro-
gram-related invention must be considered "as a whole""' to de-
termine whether they constitute patentable subject matter
under Section 101. However, cases decided subsequent to Diehr
show that the substance of a program can indeed be patented,
as long as the claim description includes some reference to a
means for executing the program's functions." 5
114. See id. at 192.
115. In view of the complexity and confusion of the case law in this area, the
USPTO established the following guidelines, extracted from the Diehr decision, to in-
struct patent examiners in determining whether a pending claim violates Section 101:
(1) The claims must be considered as a whole. It is inappropriate to dissect the
claims into old and new elements and then to ignore the presence of the old el-
ements in the analysis... The 'novelty' of any element or steps in a process,
or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the sub-
ject matter of a claim falls within the 101 categories of possible patentable sub-
ject matter
(2) When a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or applies
that formula in a structure or process which, when considered as a whole, is
performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g.,
transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the
claim satisfies the requirements of Section 101.
(3) When a claim recites a mathematical formula (or scientific principle or phe-
nomenon of nature), an inquiry must be made into whether the claim is seek-
ing patent protection for that formula in the abstract. (If the claim does seek
protection for such a mathematical formula, it would be non-statutory under
35 US.C. § 101).
(4) A mathematical formula as such is not accorded the protection of our pat-
ent laws ... and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit
the use of the formula to a particular technological environment. ... Similarly,
insignificant post solution activity will not transform an unpatentable principle
into a patentable process.
(5) When a claim as in [Flook] is drawn to a method for computing an 'alarm
limit (which) is simply a number, the claim is non-statutory under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 because Flook 'sought to protect a formula for computing this number.
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Since Diehr, the path to consistent workable standards con-
tinued to become more defined. An analysis of subsequent cases
shows a greater sense of stability in the application of the stan-
dards enunciated in the decision and gives a clearer understand-
ing of the types of software-related claims that will be consid-
ered to embrace proper statutory subject matter.116
A dramatic example of the line between statutory and non-
statutory subject matter comes from the case of In re Abele," 7
where the distinction between software implemented processes
and mere calculation was evident in the construction of the
claims. The claims in Abele were directed to an improvement in
computerized axial tomography (CAT) scanning. The claims re-
cited a method for displaying data from the CAT scan. Some of
the claims in the application were found ineligible for patent
protection because they were no more than the calculation of a
number and a display of the result, albeit in a particular for-
mat. Other claims that more specifically recited the device used
in conjunction with the algorithm were found to contain patent-
able subject matter. The CCPA further refined the Freeman-Wal-
ter two-step test by holding that if the claims would be other-
wise statutory, although inoperative or less useful without the
algorithm, the claims present statutory subject matter when the
algorithm is included. After the Abele decision, the case became
associated with the Freeman-Walter two-step test, which is now
known as the Freeman-Walter-Abele test.
4. The Federal Circuit. The Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit, while not directly considering the patentability of
software, explicitly reaffirmed the authority of decisions of its
(6) It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathemati-
cal formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection. Diehr, 450 US. at 187 (citing Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333
US. 127 (1948)); Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota and Ontario Paper Co., 261
U.S. 45 (1923); Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1876); O'Reilly v. Morse, 15
How. 62 (1853); and LeRoy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156 (1852).
PATENT AND TRADE ARK OFFIcE, US. DEpT OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PRocDURE § 2110 (5th ed. 2d rev. 1985) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 US. 175 passim
(1981)).
116. See, ag., In re Taner, 681 F.2d 787 (C.C.PA. 1982) (holding that the process
claim and its recited algorithm operated as physical signal processing elements tied to
and affecting material objects (analog data) in a specific environment); In re Pardo, 684
F2d 912 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (where the claim was essentially a software claim, seemingly
unattached to an end processor, but was held not as reciting an algorithm in the mathe-
matical sense of the word as opposed to the computer sense).
117. 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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predecessor, the CCPA, n8 and generally followed the reasoning
in the Diehr decision.
In In re Grams,"9 the Federal Circuit ruled on a claim di-
rected to a method of diagnosing an individual to determine
whether the condition of the individual was normal or abnormal.
If the condition was abnormal, the cause of the abnormality was
determined. 120 The first step of the claimed method was to
gather the data that were to be used as parameters in the diag-
nosis. The remaining steps were a mathematical algorithm mak-
ing use of the collected data. Removing the mathematical lan-
guage, the court found the only limitations in the claim were
the data-gathering steps which merely determined values for
the variables used in the mathematical formulae used in mak-
ing the calculations. The court determined that the data-
gathering step was insufficient to render the claim statutory.121
On the other hand, the court held that the mere presence of
an algorithm would not automatically preclude the patentability
of a claim. If the claim included physical steps (in addition to
the algorithm), then the claim may be eligible for patent protec-
tion if the physical steps in the claim (without the algorithm)
constitute a statutory process and if the algorithm operates on
one of the claimed physical steps. 22 The court found that the
only physical step in Grams' claims was the step of gathering
data for the algorithm, and as such, it did not operate to change
any aspect of the physical process of gathering data.
In In re Iwahashi,m3 the court ruled on the patentability of
a computer program-related invention which determined the
auto correlation coefficients for use in pattern recognition with-
out the need for expensive multipliers and other complicated cir-
cuitry.124 Instead of multiplication, addition and the use of
squares were used to determine the coefficients. The sole claim
in the application specifically recited an integrated circuit chip
used to permanently store information (ROM), in which the val-
ues of the squares of certain variables were stored. The other el-
ements in the claim were recited in the means-plus function
format. 1
118. See, In re Vamco Machine and Tool, Inc., 752 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Ci 1985).
119. 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
120. Id. at 836.
121. Id. at 840.
122. Id. at 838.
123. 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
124. Id. at 137L
125. Id. at 1372.
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The Federal Circuit reversed the holding of the USPTO that
the claim was not directed to patentable subject matter. The
court relied in part on the fact that the claim included the
ROM, a specific piece of apparatus.m Therefore, the court found
that the claim was directed to a combination of interrelated
means within the meaning of Section 101. Relying on Abele, the
court found that the fact that the apparatus operated according
to an algorithm did not make the claimed invention non-
statutory. 27 The court rejected the USPTO's arguments that the
method claim was so broad as to encompass every means for
performing the recited functions by referring to 35 U.S.C. § 112,
6, which states that each means-plus-function definition "shall
be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material or
acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof." 28
Based upon the readily recognizable hardware circuit elements
from the specification and the provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 122, the
court held the claimed invention to be statutory.
HI. RETuRN TO THE PRmRY AuTHoRITIEs
The decisions of In re Alappat,129 In re Warmerdam,10 and
In re Lowry'31 raised as many new questions as they answered.
They left no doubt that the USPTO must apply paragraph 6 to
Section 101 determinations, but they offered little concrete gui-
dance as to how that paragraph should be used. While para-
graph 6 seems to function well in the context of Sections 102
and 103 to determine the scope of a claim, the dissent in Alap-
pat hinted that the use of paragraph 6 to determine a claim's
scope produces conflicting indications in Section 101 determina-
tions. All three of these decisions appear to ignore the tradi-
tional Freeman-Walter-Abele test, and imply that the trilogy of
Supreme Court decisions, Gottschalk v. Benson,132 Parker v.
Flook,133 and Diamond v. Diehr13 4 overruled this test. In any
event, the emphasis seems to have shifted from determining
what a mathematical algorithm is, to whether the claimed in-
vention fits into one of the categories defined by 35 U.S.C. § 101,
126. Id. at 1375.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 33 E3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
130. 33 E3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
13L 32 E3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
132. 409 US. 63 (1972).
133. 437 US. 584 (1978).
134. 450 US. 175 (1981).
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namely a "process," a "machine," a "manufacture," or a "composi-
tion of matter."
A. In re Alappat
Just when it seemed that the courts, practitioners, and the
USPTO settled into a routine application of the Freeman-Walter-
Abele test, a majority of the Federal Circuit decided that the
claim at issue in Alappat was statutory subject matter without
reference to the test. In Alappat, claim 15 was to "a rasterizer
for converting vector list data representing sample magnitudes
of an input waveform into anti-aliased pixel illumination inten-
sity data to be displayed on a display means" 1 The claim was
in "means plus function" format and so was similar to the
claims in In re Noll136 and In re Freeman.
13 7
The majority rested its decision on two rationales. First, the
Alappat application clearly describes well known digital circuits
which may be correlated to each "means plus function" recita-
tion of the claims in question. Second, an analysis of the lan-
guage of apparatus claim 15, the sole independent claim, finds
that it transforms data.
While differing on the outcome, both the majority and dis-
sent agree on two significant points. First, 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6
requires the USPTO, even at the examination stage, to interpret
"means plus function" and step recitations in view of the corre-
sponding structure and acts described in the specification and
equivalents thereof m It appears to be settled that the USPTO
must consider the specification in the examination of patent ap-
plications as required by paragraph 6 in Section 101, as well as
in making Sections 102 and 103 determinations. 1 9 Second, the
majority and dissent based their reasoning on the primal au-
thorities governing statutory subject matter decisions, namely
the language of Section 101 and the trilogy of Supreme Court
decisions, Benson, Flook, and Diehr. As one would expect, the
majority and dissent treat these primary authorities quite
differently.
The majority construed Alappat's claim 15 as follows:
135. 33 F.3d at 1541.
136. 545 F.2d 141 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
137. 573 F2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
138. 33 F.3d at 1540.
139. See, In re Donaldson Co., Inc. 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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A rasterizer [a "machine"] for converting vector list data representing
sample magnitudes of an input wave form into anti-aliased pixel illumi-
nation intensity data to be displayed on a display means comprising.
(a) [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to perform an absolute value
function, or an equivalent thereof] for determining the vertical distance
between the endpoints of each of the vectors in the data list;
(b) [an arithmetic logic circuit configured to perform an absolute value
function, or an equivalent thereof] for determining the elevation of a row
of pixels that is spanned by the vector,
(c) [a pair of barrel shifters, or equivalent thereof] for normalizing the
vertical distance an elevation; and
(d) [a read only memory (ROM) containing illumination intensity data, or
an equivalent thereof] for outputting illumination intensity data as a
predetermined function of the normalized vertical distance and
elevation.140
The bracketed matter represents the structure disclosed in
Alappat's specification which corresponds to these "means plus
function" recitations. Paragraph 6 requires claim 15 to be inter-
preted to cover such structure and equivalents thereof.14 1 The
majority reasoned that each means claim could be represented
in the claim by the structure disclosed, which in this case was
two arithmetic logic circuits, a pair of barrel shifters and a
ROM. Thus the court concluded that this was a true apparatus
claim which defined a "machine" under Section 101.242
The dissent, although agreeing with the majority that Alap-
pat's claim 15 covers the structure disclosed, being the "two
ALU's, the two barrel shifters, and the ROM" and equivalents
thereof, adopted a different argument: "The presence of struc-
ture on the face of the claims does not ipso facto make the
claimed invention or discovery one of statutory subject mat-
ter."'4 To the extent that precedent of the CCPA held that only
claims which "wholly preempt" or recite "in its entirety mathe-
matics,"144 i.e., claims which did not recite any structure, were
beyond the pale of Section 101,145 the dissent would hold that
such precedent conflicts with Flook."4 According to the dissent,
the Supreme Court in Flook "expressly reversed the court's
wholesale preemption test" and "concluded that the claimed dis-
covery was nonstatutory even though the applicant's claim did
140. 33 F3d at 1541.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1542.
143. Id. at 1561 (Archer, J., dissenting).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1562.
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not wholly preempt the mathematical function involved. 147
With apparent reference to the USPTO's "otherwise statu-
tory" test, the majority asserts that Diehr requires that a Sec-
tion 101 analysis be of the "claim as a whole. 148 Although the
examination of the whole claim is dispositive as to the Section
101 issue, the majority notes that "an analysis wherein one at-
tempts to identify whether any part of a claim recites mathe-
matical subject matter which would not by itself be patentable
is not an improper analysis. Such a dissection of a claim may be
helpful under some circumstances to more fully understand the
claimed subject matter!. 49 For example, an "otherwise statutory"
analysis showing that a claim with the mathematical algorithm
recitations removed was directed to patentable subject matter,
would be convincing particularly to the USPTO. However, as
Alappat demonstrates, failure of a claim to pass the "otherwise
statutory" test is not dispositive.
The majority and the dissent disagreed on how paragraph 6
is to be applied to Section 101 determinations. The majority
agreed with Alappat that his claim 15 should cover, by virtue of
paragraph 6, a programmed general purpose digital computer,
i.e., such a computer is an equivalent of the means recited in
claim 15. As such, the majority uses paragraph 6 to conclude
that claim 15 covers well known digital circuits and is therefore
statutory and, at the same time, covers a programmed general
purpose computer, even though such computer could not be
claimed directly.50
The dissent attacks this reasoning by arguing that "[i]f a
programmed general purpose digital computer is not statutory
subject matter, then a claim cannot be drawn to that subject
matter whether outright or by application of equivalents under
35 U.S.C. [Section] 112, [paragraph] 6 ."151 According to this argu-
ment, the finding of equivalency in a programmed general pur-
pose computer proves the nonstatutory nature of Alappat's pur-
ported invention. The dissent states that "[p]aragraph 6 of
[Section] 112 is not a magical way to expand patent protection
into nonstatutory subject matter715
2
Underlying the dissents argument is the recognition of the
two-fold nature of paragraph 6. The specific structure described
147. 1d. at 1561.
148. Id. at 1544.
149. Id at 1543, n.21.





in the application corresponding to the "means plus function"
recitations tends to narrow the claim scope and to render it
statutory. Equivalency, on the other hand, tends to broaden the
claim and render it nonstatutory. Alappat's argument that his
claim 15 would cover by equivalency a programmed general pur-
pose digital computer serves to broaden the claim's scope, but if
there is no effective limit to the scope of the "means plus func-
tion recitations, then it would seem that they would be nonstat-
utory. The practical approach for the applicant, who is going to
rely on paragraph 6 for Section 101 purposes, is to spell out in
the specification as filed the equivalents or range of equivalents
which are intended for the specifically described structure.
Because of the two-fold nature of paragraph 6, the major-
ity's opinion appears to be inconsistent. The opinion first implies
that a specification merely describing a programmed general
purpose digital computer does not describe "any supporting
structure" and then, in a further breath, states that "we have
held that such programming creates a new machine, because a
general purpose computer in effect becomes a special purpose
computer once it is programmed to perform particular functions
pursuant to instructions from program software."15 3
Neither the majority nor the dissent specifically apply the
often used Freeman-Walter-Abele two-step test to determine stat-
utory subject matter based on the presence of a mathematical
algorithm. Rather both the majority and the dissent reach their
different conclusions based on the trilogy of Supreme Court deci-
sions.15' Both the majority'5 and the dissentm accept that Diehr
would not permit patent protection for "laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas." The majority, however, recog-
nizes a fourth prohibited category, mathematical algorithms,
whereas, the dissent would limit its analysis to whether the
claimed invention fell into one of the three categories named by
Diehr.57 The majority commented that:
The Supreme Court also has held that certain mathematical subject mat-
ter is not, standing alone, entitled to patent protection. (Citations omit-
ted) A close analysis of Diehr, Flook, and Benson reveals that the Su-
preme Court never intended to create an overly broad, fourth category of
subject matter excluded from [Section] 101. Rather, at the core of the
Court's analysis in each of these cases lies an attempt by the Court to
153. Id at 1545.
154. Benson, 409 US. 63; Flook, 437 U.S. 584; Diehr, 450 U.S. 175.
155. 33 F.3d at 1542.
156. Id. at 1582 (Archer, J., dissenting).
157. See, Diehr, 450 US. at 191.
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explain a rather straightforward concept, namely, that certain types of
mathematical subject matter, standing alone, represent nothing more
than abstract ideas until reduced to some type of practical application,
and thus that subject matter is not, in and of itself, entitled to patent
protection.
8
The dissent, in refusing to define what constitutes a mathe-
matical algorithm, counters that:
It is unnecessary to discuss what is or is not a "mathematical algorithm,"
as opposed to being a mathematical "relationship," "formula," "operation,"
"function," "principle," 'theory," or the like. The Supreme Court did not
arrive at its holdings in Benson, Flook, and Diehr, discussed infra, by
creating a new rule about "algorithms" and finding in two cases algo-
rithms and in the other no algorithm. Rather, the holdings are expressly
based upon the axioms that abstract ideas, principles, and laws of nature
are not patentable subject matter, but that their useful applications may
be. Mathematic operations, like ideas and laws of nature, are not useful
applications and therefore not statutory subject matter. The hypertechni-
cal distinction between calling something a mathematical "algorithm"
versus another mathematic noun is without legal distinction. 1 9
The majority used a "wholly preemption" rationale not un-
like the second step of the Freeman-Walter-Abele test in holding
Alappat's claim 15 statutory. They found that the claim was
"limited to the use of a particularly claimed combination of ele-
ments performing the particularly claimed combination of calcu-
lations to transform, i.e., rasterize, digitized waveforms (data)
into anti-aliased, pixel illumination data to produce a smooth
waveform."16° Furthermore, the majority found that "the claim
preamble's recitation that the subject matter for which Alappat
seeks patent protection is a rasterizer for creating a smooth
waveform is not a mere field-of-use label having no signifi-
cance"161 As such, Alappat's claim 15 was found to define a com-
bination of elements constituting a "machine" within the statu-
tory subject matter defined in Section 101. It was not a
disembodied mathematical concept which could be characterized
as an "abstract idea," but rather a specific machine to produce a
useful, concrete, and tangible result.
The dissent squarely rests its conclusion on the trilogy of
Supreme Court decisions, stating "[u]nder Benson, Flook, and
Diehr the posing and solution of a mathematic function is non-
158. 33 E3d at 1543.
159. Id. at 1555, n.16 (Archer, J., dissenting).




statutory subject matter."162 This is so even if the mathematical
algorithm. is carried out on a particular general purpose com-
puter or digital circuitry. In reaching the conclusion that Alap-
pat's claim 15 is no more than the prohibited "posing and solu-
tion," the dissent notes that claim 15 recites merely a
"rasterizer" in contrast to an "oscillator" which would include a
display, e.g., a cathode ray tube.16 Focusing on the claim's pre-
amble, the dissent comments "[t]he preamble calls the data
'anti-aliased pixel illumination intensity data.' Of course, no
matter how many adjectives the claim uses to describe data,
data are still data - i.e., pure numbers."164
As a practical matter, it may have been preferred to redraft
such a "data" recitation as "an electrical signal indicative of the
desired value of the anti-aliased pixel illumination intensity In
the end, the dissent concludes that:
Claim 15 as a whole thus claims old circuitry elements in an arrange-
ment defined by a mathematical operation, which only performs the very
mathematical operation that defines it. Rather than claiming the mathe-
matics itself, which of course Alappat cannot do, Alappat claims the
mathematically defined structure. But as a whole there is no "applica-
tion" apart from the mathematical operation that is asserted to be the
invention or discovery.16
In summary, the Alappat court took a much broader view of
Section 101 than the mere application of the traditional Free-
man-Walter-Abele test. The court instead relied on the philo-
sophical underpinning of that test. Consequently, the test re-
mains in place as a helpful guide.166 However, where the test
fails, the applicant can still argue the general principles to meet
the requirements for statutory subject matter. Even so, in the
case of In re Schrader,1 67 the dissent asserted that the test was
met, yet the claims were rejected as non-statutory subject mat-
ter on the basis that no physical quantities were being manipu-
lated. As a matter of fact, the court has suggested that a return
to the general principals as enunciated in Diehr may be the best
coursel ss
162. Id. at 1557 (Archer, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 1563 (Archer, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 1563, n.24 (Archer, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 1563-64 (dissenting).
166. The Freeman-Walter-Abele test was applied in the subsequent case of In re
Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
167. 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
168. In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d at 1359.
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B. In re Warmerdam: Are Data Structures Statutory Subject
Matter?
Most program related cases are directed to application pro-
grams which interface with data that may be stored in particu-
lar data structures. A "data structure" is defined as a "physical
or logical relationship among data elements, designed to support
specified data manipulation functions."169 The court in In re
Bradley7" found such structures to be patentable. However, in
In re Warmerdam,1 1 the USPTO argued that a claim to a "data
structure" generated by the method of any of claims 1 through 4
"is not one of the categories of subject matter recited in Section
101, to wit, a process, machine, manufacture, composition of
matter, or an improvement thereof' 72
The Federal Circuit agreed with the USPTO in this case in
rejecting claims 1-4 as nonstatutory, but not on the argued ra-
tionale that it preempted a mathematical algorithm prescribed
by the Freeman-Walter-Abele test. In the trend that began in
Alappat, the court comments that it has sought within "Su-
preme Court guidance ... to find more precise definitions for
the things excluded" from [Section] 101."' 73 The court notes that
not all of its attempts for greater precision had met with "com-
plete success," for example In re Schrader."4 In Schrader, the
court applied the Freeman-Walter-Abele test finding a mathe-
matical algorithm, 75 namely "summing" 7 6
According to the court, the trouble with this often-used test
"is that there is no clear agreement as to, what is a 'mathemati-
cal algorithm,' which makes rather dicey the determination of
whether the claim as a whole is no more than that."7 7 An alter-
native to creating these arbitrary definitional terms which devi-
ate from those used in the statute may lie simply in returning
to the language of the statute and the Supreme Court's basic
principles as enunciated in Diehr, and eschewing efforts to de-
169. IEEE STANDARD CoMPuTER DIcnoNARY (1991).
170. 600 F.2d 807 (CCPA 1979).
171. 33 F3d 1354 (Fed. Cim 1994).
172. Id. at 1358.
173. Id. at 1358-59. See supra note 129 and accompanying text discussing the sig-
nificance of the trilogy of Supreme Court decisions
174. 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (note that Judge Plager not only authored
Warmerdam but also Schrader).
175. 33 F.3d at 1359.
176. 22 F.3d at 292.
177. 33 F3d at 1359 (citing Schrader, 22 F.3d at 292 n.5 and dissent thereto).
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scribe nonstatutory subject matter in other terms.178
According to the court, Warmerdam was a good example of
the difficulty in identifying whether a claim, here claim 1, re-
cites an algorithm or not. The USPTO argued that the specifica-
tion describes the use of a known mathematical procedure, the
Hilditch Skeletonization method, acknowledged by the court as
being the only practical embodiment. 179 On the other hand,
Warmerdam argues that claim 1 is broad enough to cover the
physical measuring of the contour of the object, and does not re-
quire the known method described in the specification. The
court agreed with Warmerdam and concluded that, "The fact
that the claim covers methods which are essentially mathemati-
cal in nature, as discussed infra, is not dispositve. Claims
should be evaluated by their limitations, not by what they inci-
dentally cover."'m
The court felt that there was no need to find the "proper
meaning of the label mathematical algorithm,"1"1 but rather
states that "the dispositive issue for assessing compliance with
Section 101 in this case is whether the claim is for a process
that goes beyond simply manipulating 'abstract ideas' or 'natu-
ral phenomena! "182 In other words, the proper test is not find-
ing the elusive mathematical algorithm, but rather determining
whether the claimed invention, considered as a whole, is one of
those three categories prescribed by Diehr, namely "laws of na-
ture, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas."18 The court con-
cluded that "[t]hese steps describe nothing more than the ma-
nipulation of basic mathematical constructs, the paradigmatic
'abstract idea.' "184 Since abstract ideas are not statutory subject
matter, a data structure defined by those ideas is also nonstatu-
tory subject matter.
The court stated that there is nothing magical about the
term "data structure." The court rejected Warmerdam's reliance
on Bradley,185 stating that, "[t]he 'data structure' at issue in that
case was a physical, interconnected arrangement of hardware
and thus embraced by the term 'machine'."m "The same cannot
be said of the data structure that is at issue in this case. Con-
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1360.
180. Id. at 1359.
181. Id. at 1360.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1358.
184. Id. at 1360.
185. 600 F.2d 807.
186. 33 F.3d at 1362 (citing Bradley, 600 F.2d at 812-13).
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trary to Warmerdam's assertion, the phrase does not imply a
physical arrangement of the contents of a memory"
187
C. In re Lowry: A Data Structure Stored On a Memory is
Deemed Patentable
In the recent case of In re Lowry,'m the Federal Circuit held
for the first time that a claim reciting essentially a memory
with data stored thereon, is patentable subject matter. The ex-
aminer had rejected Lowry's claims 1-5 as being nonstatutory
under Section 101 and as being obvious under Section 103. The
USPTO Board agreed that the claims to a particular claimed
data structure were within the bounds of Section 101 as an arti-
cle of manufacture, but rejected them under Section 103. Basi-
cally the USPTO took the position that the data structure was
printed matter and relied on the holding in In re Gulack,8 9 that
"[w]here the printed matter [data structure] is not functionally
related to the substrate [memory], the printed matter will not
distinguish the invention from the prior art in terms of patenta-
bility."190 Thus the Board concluded that no patentable weight
would be given to the data structure specified in the claims and
the claims were thus not patentable over prior data structures
with different arrangements.
The Federal Circuit reversed the Board's decision holding
that it was an improper extension of the court's printed matter
holdings under Section 102 to a rejection under Section 103.
Further, the court explains why the printing matter cases are
not relevant to the claimed data structures, stating:
The printed matter cases "dealt with claims defining as the invention
certain novel arrangements of printed lines or characters, useful and in-
telligible only to the human mind ... . The printed matter cases have no
factual relevance where "the invention as defined by the claims requires
that the information be processed not by the mind but by a machine, the
computer... Lowry's data structures... are processed by a machine
.... The printed matter cases have no factual relevance here. 91
Even though Lowry deals with an obviousness rejection, it
is relevant to this discussion of statutory subject matter. First, it
deals with "printed matter" which has, at least previously, been
187. Id.
188. 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
189. 703 F.2d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
190. Id. at 1385.
191. 32 .3d at 1583 (citing In re Bernbart, 417 1395, 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
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considered a category of nonstatutory matter. Second, this case
may be important for what it did not hold, namely that the Fed-
eral Circuit did not expressly abandon "printed matter" as a cat-
egory of nonstatutory subject matter, even though both Alappat
and Warmerdam seem to have deliberately avoided definitions of
statutory subject matter other than those named in Diehr and
Section 101 itself. Third, in accordance with this trend, the
court demonstrates its preference for the "article of manufac-
ture" definition over the "printed matter" definition of statutory
subject matter. Fourth, even though the court decides the fate of
claims 1-5 based upon Section 103, it offers comments which
seem to be relevant to the Section 101 issue.
Though no statutory subject matter rejection is at issue, the
court explains why Lowry's claimed memory is not merely an
"abstract idea:"
Contrary to the PTO's assertion, Lowry does not claim merely the infor-
mation content of a memory. Lowry's data structures, while including
data resident in a database, depend only functionally on information con-
tent. While the information content affects the exact sequence of bits
stored in accordance with Lowry's data structures, the claims require
specific electronic structural elements which impart a physical organiza-
tion on the information stored in memory. Lowry's invention manages in-
formation. As Lowry notes, the data structures provide increased com-
puting efficiency. Indeed, Lowry does not seek to patent the Attributive
data model in the abstract. Nor does he seek to patent the content of in-
formation resident in a database. Rather, Lowry's data structures impose
a physical organization on the data.m
Next the court demonstrates that the claimed invention of
Lowry is really that article of manufacture listed in Section 101:
In Lowry's invention, the stored data adopt no physical "structure"
per se. Rather, the stored data exist as a collection of bits having infor-
mation about relationships between the ADOs [attributable data objects].
Yet this is the essence of electronic structure. In Bernhart, this court's
predecessor noted:
There is one further rationale used by both the board and the exam-
iner, namely, that the provision of new signals to be stored by the
computer does not make it a new machine, i.e., it is structurally the
same, no matter how new, useful and unobvious the result.... To
this question we say that if a machine is programmed in a certain
new and unobvious way, it is physically different from the machine
without that program; its memory elements are differently arranged.
The fact that these physical changes are invisible to the eye should
192. I&
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not tempt us to conclude that the machine has not been changed."3
More than mere abstraction, the data structures are specific
electrical or magnetic structural elements in a memory. Accord-
ing to Lowry, the data structures provide tangible benefits: data
stored in accordance with the claimed data structures are more
easily accessed, stored, and erased. Lowry further notes that,
unlike prior art data structures, Lowry's data structures simul-
taneously represent complex data accurately and enable power-
ful nested operations. In short, Lowry's data structures are
physical entities that provide increased efficiency in computer
operation.'"
Though the above comments are on their face directed to
the "printed subject matter" issue, they also provide guidance
for drafting claims to memories with data structures or perhaps
an application program stored therein, so as to avoid Section
101 problems. A claim reciting a memory for storing "mere data"
would not be allowed in view of the above comments at least
under a "printed matter" rejection, if not a Section 101 rejection.
Though something more than "mere data" is required, the oper-
ative question is: what is that something? First, that something
need not be that "relation between" the data and the memory
which was recognized by the Board.19 5 Rather, the Federal Cir-
cuit only required a "physical organization on the data stored in
memory.196 Second, to avoid the "printed matter" rejection, the
claim must "require" that the stored data be processed by a ma-
chine, e.g., a computer.197
How does the data structure in Warmerdam relate to the
memory/data claim structure approved in Lowry? Both data
structures are of a hierarchical configuration. Warmerdam's
data structure comprised a hierarchy of spheres, which
Warmerdam admitted to be old; Warmerdam only asserted that
his method of generating the spheres was novel. Even if novel,
the stored data to define such a hierarchy of spheres may only
comprise for each level of the hierarchy a set of coordinates de-
fining the sphere centers and the corresponding radii. Unless
the data was stored in some functional relation either to the
computer using that data or to the data itself, such sets of coor-
dinates and radii might well be deemed unpatentable "mere
193. Bernhart, 417 F.2d at 1400.
194. 1&L at 1583-84.
195. Id. at 1581.
196. Id. at 1583.
197. See Lowry, 32 F.3d at 1583; Bernhart, 417 F.2d at 1399-1400.
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data." The dicta in Warmerdam that his machine claim 5 was
statutory seems to be distinguishable from the holding in Lowry
that his data structure/memory claims 1-5 were patentable.
First, Warmerdam deals with Section 101 and Lowry with Sec-
tions 102 and 103. Second and more to the point of the forego-
ing discussion, claim 5 of Warmerdam recites a machine com-
prising a memory, whereas claims 1-4 of Lowry merely recite a
memory for storing his data structure. It is the absence of the
machine or computer that renders claims in the Lowry format of
significant commercial interest.
The question now becomes, are claims merely to a memory
for storing a computer program patentable? Lowry may suggest
that if the instructions of the program are arranged in a "physi-
cal organization" either between the instructions per se and/or
between the instructions and the data to be processed, then a
claim to such a structure may pass muster over a "printed mat-
ter" rejection under Sections 102 and 103, and presumably over
a nonstatutory rejection under Section 101.198
IV. CLAmNG ELECTRONIC AND SOFTWAm TECmNOLOGES IN
LIGHT OF ALAPPAT, WARMERDAM, and LoWRY
A. The Current Practice
Courts and the Patent and Trademark Office are beginning
to show some uniformity in the treatment of software claims,
are becoming adept at construing them, and are appearing to be
generally at ease under the guide of Diehr. Although adherence
to the traditional definition of algorithm has still been subject to
some debate, it seems likely that the Diehr analysis will con-
tinue to be controlling. For purposes of Section 101 subject mat-
ter requirements, the algorithm problem can be avoided by ap-
plying some general rules. If the claim embraces a purely
mathematical algorithm and is drawn to that algorithm, it is
clearly unpatentable subject matter. When a software related
claim contains no algorithm or has specific elements that are
end use-related, it is proper statutory subject matter under Sec-
tion 101 and will be subject to the other criteria of patentabil-
ity.L" Claim drafters should realize that claims must go beyond
198. The USPTO has a policy of rejecting clailm which merely recite a memory and
a set of instructions stored therein recited in means plus function format. However,
some applications have slipped through and have issued. The question now is: what pol-
icy will the USPTO adopt with respect to Lowry claims?
199. Among the software-related patents issued in the United States are:
(1) No. 4,823,108, DIsPL&Y SYSTEM AND MEMORY ARCHIECTuRE AND MRTHoD
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mere calculation, manipulation or insignificant post-solution ac-
tivity in order to be patentable subject matter. Significantly,
mere use in a larger process is not an automatic qualification
for subject matter patentability; some end-use application may
also be necessary.
Claims that embrace software standing alone as a process
can be proper subject matter, but it is wise to tie the process to
some means for carrying out the functions performed by the pro-
gram.200 Additionally, if the software program itself can be de-
scribed as an electronic hard-wired configuration of the com-
puter, it may qualify for protection as an apparatus claim drawn
solely to the electronic configuration. Important in this regard is
the fact that, should the hard-wired version be afforded protec-
tion, a competitor's software version could easily be found to be
an infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.
20'
Despite qualifying as proper subject matter and passing the
test of novelty, usefulness and nonobviousness, applications are
denied if the applicant fails to describe the invention "in such
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person
skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most
nearly connected, to make and use the same."20 2 Section 112 also
requires the applicant to disclose the "best mode" of practicing
the invention. These requirements have an impact on the possi-
bility of maintaining trade secret protection that must be care-
FOR DISPLAYING IMAGES IN WINDOWS ON A VIDEO DISPLAY (assigned to
Quarterdeck Office Systems), directed to an operating environment for permit-
ting multiple programs to display information in overlapping window on a
screen in which the individual programs do not have to be written to use the
windowing feature;
(2) No. 4,807,182, APPARATUs AND METHOD FOR COMPARING DATA GROUPS (as-
signed to Advance Software, Inc.), directed to a computer system for perform-
ing comparisons of an original and a modified version of a document;
(3) No. 4,642,763, BATCH FILE PROCESSING (assigned to IBM Corp.), directed to
a method of processing batch files in a DOS-based computer system;
(4) No. 4,555,775, DYNAMIC GENERATION AND OvERiAYING OF GRAPIC Wnmows
FOR MULTIPLE ACTnVE PROGRAM STORAGE AREAS (assigned to AT&T Bell Labora-
tories), directed to a computer system having the capability of displaying mul-
tiple overlapping windows on a screen in which each the context of is continu-
ally updated; and
(5) No. 4,464,652, CURSOR CONTROL DEVCE FOR USE WIm DISPLAY SYSTEMS (as-
signed to Apple Computer, Inc.), claims 11-13 directed to the pull-down menu
system utilized in the Macintosh computer.
200. See, eg., United States Patent No. 4,135,240 on one aspect of the UNIX operat-
ing system written as a 'means for" claim: coL 5 line 48-55 stating any implementation
of the same invention in software would be obvious to those skilled in the computer art.
201. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
202. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURES § 2110.
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fully considered in an overall assessment of how best to protect
software.
B. Claim Limitations to Prevent Algorithm Preemption
Where there is a mathematical algorithm invention, it is
not patentable as such. Thus, it must be limited so as not to
preempt all uses of the algorithm. The question is what must be
added to make the algorithm statutory subject matter.
1. Limiting The Field of Use. One possibility is to limit the
field of use of the algorithm. However, in In re Waldbaum, 203 the
Court found claims to an algorithm for counting the ones in a
data word to be non-statutory, even though the ones repre-
sented busy telephone lines. In the Walter case the court held:
The preamble in the claim involved in Fook, while limiting the applica-
tion of the claimed method to "a process comprising the catalytic chemi-
cal conversion of hydrocarbons," did not serve to render the method stat-
utory because the claim, as a whole, was still directed to the solution of a
mathematical problem.2 4
Illustrative, is the Federal Circuit's decision in Arrhythmia
Research Technology, Inc., v. Corazonix Corp.,205 from which it is
clear that the "what is being done in the real world" question
can be answered in such a way that the claim as a whole is in
the statutory subject matter realm. The preamble to claim 1 of
the Arrhythmia patent recites: "A method for analyzing electro-
cardiograph signals to determine the presence or absence of a
predetermined level of high frequency energy in the late QRS
signal."206 The elements of the claim further recite: "converting
. . . signals . . . applying... time segments [signals]... to a
high pass filter means; [and] determining [a] . . . value of the
amplitude of the [signal] output of said fiter; and comparing
said value with said predetermined level. 07
At each step of the Arrhythmia claim 1, "signals" are explic-
itly or implicitly recited. Furthermore, the signals are clearly
physical signals related to the real world function of electrocar-
diograph analysis.
203. 559 F.2d 611 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
204. In re Walter, 618 E2d 758, 767 (C.C.PA 1980).
205. 958 F2d 1053 (Fed. Cir 1992).
206. Id. at 1055.
207. Id. at 1055.
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The Arrhythmia decision evinces a useful drafting tip: em-
phasize the real world application being performed and the
physical nature of the operations (or "means") being performed
(or used); reference to the "signals" being processed can be espe-
cially useful.
2. Information Gathering And Post-Solution Steps. Two
further possibilities for limiting the scope of a claim to an al-
gorithm are the addition of information gathering steps and
post-solution activities. However, "[g]iven that the method of
solving a mathematical equation may not be the subject of pat-
ent protection, it follows that the addition of the old and neces-
sary antecedent steps of establishing values for the variables in
the equation cannot convert the unpatentable method to patent-
able subject matter."
208
Even if the steps antecedent to solution of the algorithm are
new, because the algorithm is newly discovered, the subject
matter is not made statutory by their inclusion in the claims.
209
The same is true of conventional post-solution activity. "The
question in this case is whether the identification of a limited
category of useful, though conventional, post-solution applica-
tions of such a formula makes respondent's method eligible for
patent protection."210 "The notion that post-solution activity, no
matter how conventional or obvious in itself, can transform an
unpatentable principle into a patentable process exalts form
over substance."21'
The CCPA held in Walter that, "I]f the end-product of a
claimed invention is a pure number ... the invention is non-
statutory regardless of any post-solution activity which makes it
available for use by a person or machine for other purposes. If,
however, the claimed invention produces a physical thing...,
the fact that it is represented in numerical form does not render
the claim nonstatutory."12 The court continued that "[i]f [Sec-
tion] 101 could be satisfied by the mere recordation of the re-
sults of a non-statutory process on some record medium, even
the most unskilled patent draftsman could provide for such a
step, thus converting a nonstatutory process to a statutory one
208. In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1973). See also In re Grams,
888 F.2d 835, 839 (Fed Cir. 1989); In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d. 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
209. In re RicbmAn, 563 F.2d 1026, 1030 (C.CYP.A. 1977).
210. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978).
211. Id. at 590.




In Flook the calculation of a new alarm limit did not make
the claims statutory, but in In re Johnson,2 14 the Court found
that the recording of new, noiseless seismic traces on a record
medium caused the claims to overcome the prohibitions of Sec-
tion 101. This indicates that language in a claim directed to the
recordation of a trace may not make the claim statutory, but the
recitation of new method steps for generating trace signals may
cause the claim to define statutory subject matter.
The process claimed in In re Taner,215 passed muster as
statutory subject matter in part because it involved imparting
seismic waves to the ground and retrieving them, as well as an-
alyzing the results.
These decisions evince two useful claim drafting tips. First,
the patent practitioner should include descriptive labels to em-
phasize the non-abstract significance of mathematical or numer-
ical quantities that appear as part of a claim, e.g., "forming (or
storing, comparing, or receiving) a signal having a value indicat-
ing the loudness of a sound (or pressure)." Second, the patent
practitioner should incorporate the algorithm steps (or elements)
in a cooperative way with the data gathering steps and hard-
ware elements, e.g., "in a system for detecting narrow-band sig-
nals in a noisy environment, forming a set of fourier transform
coefficient signals based on each of a plurality of samples from
an antenna."
3. Use Versus Calculation Limitations. The Federal Circuit
and its predecessor, the CCPA, have held that claims containing
an algorithm are not statutory where they are "directed to a cal-
culation and would have preempted use of the algorithm in
making the calculation." However, claims are statutory "where
the claims [are] to methods of operating [a] . . . system."21 6 "The
decisive factor is whether a claimed method is essentially a
mathematical calculation."217 Thus if the claims are merely di-
rected to calculation, they are non-statutory. However, when the
claims use the calculation to control some other process or appa-
ratus, they are statutory.
The drafting tip from the above discussion is to avoid un-
necessary use of mathematical names for means or steps in-
213. Id. at 770.
214. 589 F2d 1070 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
215. 681 F.2d 787 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
216. In re Waldbaum, 559 F.2d 611, 617 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (emphasis in original).
217. In re Richman 563 F2d 1026, 1030 (C.C.PA. 1977).
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cluded in claims. Use nouns (e.g., "comparing means") or ger-
unds (e.g., step of "comparing") that have real world physical
significance whenever possible.
In summary, under the Freeman-Walter-Abele test, if claims
recite an algorithm covering computer program-related subject
matter, but that algorithm is not a mathematical algorithm,
they comply with 35 U.S.C. § 101. If the claims recite a mathe-
matical algorithm, they may still qualify as patentable subject
matter if the algorithm is applied to physical elements or pro-
cess steps in such a way that knowledge of the algorithm is be-
ing used, but the mathematical algorithm itself is not pre-
empted. This use of the algorithm must include more than a
field of use limitation in the claim preamble, information gath-
ering steps or non-essential post solution activity.
C. Putting Alappat, Warmerdam, and Lowry to Practice
It seems that the USPTO is making two types of Section
101 rejections. The first deals with software per se, and the sec-
ond deals with computer program-related inventions which
make use of a mathematical algorithm. Robert Greene Sterne et
al. offer specific advice, "[b]y originally drafting the claims with
the question 'What did the applicant invent?' in mind, the
probability of receiving a statutory subject matter rejection can
be decreased."
1. Drafting The Claimed Invention To Be Read 'As a
Whole." The USPTO considers the claims of any computer pro-
gram-related invention in which the process steps or, apparatus
elements are described at least in part in terms of mathematical
algorithms, "as a whole" as outlined in Diehr.219 Because of this,
the preamble and the body of the claims should be drafted with
functional language. This will serve to enable the examiner to
understand the claimed invention "as a whole." Nonetheless,
"field of use limitations," "insignificant post solution activity" or
mere "data gathering" must be carried to the specification; they
cannot render a claim directed to non-statutory subject matter
statutory by simply reciting the above concepts in the claim.
The specification for any computer program-related invention
should be drafted with statutory subject matter in mind. Also,
218. Robert Greene Sterne, et al, Preparing and Prosecuting Electronic and Com-
puter Related Applications: Avoiding and Overcoming Statutory Subject Matter Rejec-
tions, 33 J.L & TEcH. 297 (1993).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 107-116.
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the descriptive use of hardware is useful. Include as much hard-
ware as possible when describing the invention, even where it
consists of only software. Such a high level illustration of the
computer platform on which the software operates should be de-
scribed and illustrated in the patent application.
The patent practitioner should avoid only claiming the
mathematical aspects of the invention in the specification. This
is accomplished by explaining any transformation that is taking
place, be it of signals or physical elements, or by explaining how
the mathematical algorithm is applied in any manner to physi-
cal elements or process steps. It is always easier to argue that
the claims as a whole satisfy the requirements of Section 101 if
the invention is described in the specification at a high level.
2. Specific Claim Language Essential to Claim Drafting.
The invention cannot be described simply as a mathematical al-
gorithm. It is essential that the computer program-related
method be described and claimed within the context of a ma-
chine environment, e.g., a computer.220 Sterne et al. offer two
recommendations to accomplish this. First, it is recommended
"that the words 'computer-based' be inserted before the word
'method' in method claims."221 They also recommend "inserting
the words 'computer-based' before the words 'system' and 'appa-
ratus' in apparatus and system claims."22 This is especially im-
portant when the system or apparatus claims are written in
means plus function format.
3. Types of Claims To Be Used in Claim Drafting. To facili-
tate the Section 101 evaluation, the patent practitioner should
use system and/or apparatus claims in the application. Sterne et
al. recommend that two sets of system and/or apparatus claims
be drafted.m The first set should use the means plus function
form under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6.22 The second set should use
specific architecture and/or hardware components.2
220. See supra text accompanying note 195-197.
221. Sterne, supra note 218 at 310.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 311.
224. See, Ex parte Akamatsu, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915 (B.P-.AL 1992) (holding that
means plus function claims that differ from method claims only in "means for" terms
before steps must be treated as indistinguishable from method claims in determining
whether method is statutory subject matter).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 123-128 discussing Iwahashi. Iwahashis
claim reciting a read only memory (ROM) was held to be statutory since the ROM was
considered to be "a specific piece of apparatus," such that the claim did not wholly pre-
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The patent practitioner should also include in the specifica-,
tion any possible hardware components that could be substi-
tuted for the computer program-related methods. Even if not
claiming the specific hardware, this recitation of hardware in
the specification, and especially in the claims, facilitates the
Section 101 determination. Once claims are rejected under Sec-
tion 101, hardware elements that are not specifically discussed
in the specification cannot be added ex post facto to make the
claims statutory.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit decisions in Alappat, Warmerdam, and
Lowry acknowledged the current practice of patent practitioners
in claiming the invention as an application of the algorithm di-
rected to a specific device or apparatus, as opposed to the al-
gorithm itself If a claim embraces a purely mathematical al-
gorithm and is drawn to that algorithm, it is clearly
unpatentable subject matter. If, however, the claims embracing
an algorithm can be tied to the means of carrying out the func-
tions performed by the program by describing the computer pro-
gram-related method in the context of a machine or computer
environment, it is patentable subject matter.
These Federal Circuit decisions are a continued expression
of the Supreme Court's liberal views toward patentable subject
matter and algorithms in Diehr. By allowing algorithms to be
patented if they are reduced to some type of practical applica-
tion, the Federal Circuit has moved away from attempting to de-
fine what a mathematical algorithm is to a more practical and
useful endeavor of determining whether the claimed invention
fits into one of the statutory subject matter categories of 35
U.S.C. § 101. As such, the USPTO and the courts should expand
patent protection to algorithms and other computer program-
related inventions on a broader scale in order to keep up with
technological advances so that these new and useful inventions
can be afforded patent protection. Since it seems likely that
Congress will not be providing any direction in this matter, the
USPTO and the courts must continue to show uniformity in
their treatment of algorithm and computer program-related pat-
ent claims under the guide of Diehr.
empt the use of the algorithm recited in the claim. 888 F.2d at 1375.
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